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The development of segregation in South Africa has most commonly been perceived as 
representing the emergence of a racial-caste society that overthrew the values of 
Cape liberalism. According to this thesis, the creation of Union in South Africa in 
1910 marked a central political hiatus from which the successive political decline of 
the llCape liberal traditiont1 can be traced. (1) Segregationist ideology, therefore, 
owed more to the influences of the northern Boer Republics, governed by the implicitly 
anti-liberal doctrine of "no equality in church and state", or else to the conservative 
policies of Theophilus Shepstone in Natal and the careful preservation of Zulu tribal 
structures (2), than it did to the society of the Cape, which has been seen as 
developing a very different system of social or~zation. Thus Phyllis Lewsen has 
argued that, while the protectionist land policies in the Eastern Cape from the time 
of Sir George Grey mark a certain similarity with the twentieth century creation of 
Bantu  horne eland^^^, nevertheless, by the time of Union, there was an identifiable 
llconservative liberalism" in the Cape marked by a "determination to hold on to its 
principles of governmentf1 and which "had a hold in both parties and language groups, 
and was linked with institutions, which gave it growing tenacityv1. (3) Union itself, 
therefore, becomes the central factor in the explanation of the course of twentieth 
century South African history and the impression is left that, if a somewhat different 
political system had been created - on the lines, for instance, of a federation 
rather than a Union - then the Cape "liberalt1 institutions would have been able to 
survive. (4) 
Such a political view of the evolution of South African history can be 
traced to a wider view in much liberal South African historiography of the impact of 
the frontier. From the early 1930s such historians as Eric Walker, I. D. Maccrone 
(thou& he was essentially a social psychologist), C. W. de Kiewiet and S. H. ~rankel(5), 
developed an explanation for the development of racial segregation in twentieth century 
South Africa in terms of the legacy of the frontier. Much of this accrued from the 
earlier work of the historian Bederick Jackson 'Purner and his school in 
the United States, though the differences between the American West and the South 
African frontier were acknowledged. "It was not a romantic frontier [in South Africalll, 
wrote de Kiewiet, "like the American West or heroic like the North West fiontier of 
India. Legend has denied the Pondos, for example, a place beside the Pawnees or the 
Pathans. The stuff of legend is not easily found in a process which turned Ama-Xosa, 
Zulus, or Basuto into farm labourers, kitchen servants, or messengers. l' (6) - 
Nevertheless, "the frontier was the stage where, more spectacularly than elsewhere, 
was taking place the great revolution of South African history ... As the Europeans 
advanced, they did not succeed in driving the Kafirs back into their hinterland. The 
Xafirs were crowded into areas which steadily grew less able to maintain them, or 
lived as squatters and labourers upon the land that had fallen to the Europeans. This 
was the pattern of every subsequent frontier of contact between Europeans and 
nativesf1. (7) 
This impact of the frontier, so the liberal school has argued, becomes in 
turn the central causative explanation behind the generation of segregationist . 
ideology in the twentieth century and its overthrowing of liberalism in the Cape. 
In effect, the strong political and cultural legacies of racial stereotyping from the 
clays of the frontier are sufficient to explain the resilience of racial ideology in 
the increasingly urban society of South Africa in the wake of the diamond and gold 
mining revolutions at Kimberley and on the. Witwatersrand in the 1870s and 1880s. 
Thus fiancis Wilson has written that the pressures towards segregation amse from 
"the platteland" : 
In the towns the interaction was different from that 
on both reserves and farms. Not only were the 
relationships between the diverse groups more 
impersonal, but also the process of urbanization came 
too late to influence the norms by which the 
politically dominant, white, m u p  .judged and to which 
it sought to mould social interaction as the country 
- became institutionalized. (8) (emphasis added) 
Similarly, David Welsh has argued that, despite the fact that "urbanization 
undermined the master/servant relationship between white and non-white that had been 
established in the pre-industrial era", nevertheless "industry was forced to defer to 
traditional white attitudes and, with the consolidation of segregation from the 1920s 
onward, the traditional pattern was re-established through, it is suggested, on a more 
insecure foundation1'. (9) 
The assumptions of this argwnent can be seen as owing a great deal to the 
legacy of nineteenth century liberal and radical thought on the nature of capitalist 
industrialization in the metropolitan context and which has survived in a 
considerable amount of writing in the social sciences in the twentieth. This 
"technologico-Benthamite" view, as Leavis called it (10), rests essentially on the 
inherent rationality of capitalist accumulation and a belief in its ultimate ability to 
transcend the cultural and ideological legacies of the pre-industrial era. The view, 
therefore, reflected the essential optimism of the early writers on industrialization, 
such as St Simon and Comte in France, Jererny Bentham and the two Mills in England, 
and later 13rentano in Gemany, in what was perceived as an "age of progress11. However, 
with the development of a much more pessimistic outlook in the twentieth century, with 
its legacy both of total war and economic depression, this optimism has become tempered 
by a somewhat more cautious assessment of the inherent logic of capitalist 
industrialization. Following in particular the thesis of Herbert Blumer, that the 
industrialization process can be seen as a.ccommodating itself to, rather than 
transcending, the values and ideology of the pre-industrial order, the liberal school 
has had to be somewhat less grandiose in its claims than many of its predecessors. 
Kevertheless, even if some of the most strident of the schoolfs contemporary followers, 
such as Michael OfDowd, admit that capitalist industrialization will not result in a 
society exactly on the Wopean or American pattern, but will rather verge towax& one 
or" ttpluralismn (ll), the essential optimism remains. Welsh's remark on the essential 
insecurity for the foundations of urban segregation suggests that an alternative 
model can be created through the logic of the present industrialization process in 
South Africa and lead to the emergence of a society resting to a considerable degree 
on liberal values. (12) 
The nub of this essential optimism of the liberal school can be seen, in 
part, to rest on an historical interpretation of the Cape liberal tradition, and 
returns again to the political hiatus view that was seen to occur mound the time of 
Union in 1910. The tenacity of the liberal school, as an ideological world view, 
rests on a reading of history, and here the appeal to Cape liberal values rests 
upon the assumption that they were destroyed by something else. So to this extent a 
critical examination of the current liberal position in South Africa depends upon an 
assessment of Cape liberalism in the time before Union. 
The Evolution of Cape Liberal Ideology 
One of the errors of the liberal school has been the somewhat static 
perception of the nature of Cape liberalism. It is a false perception, for 
liberalism in the Cape had its own internal dynamics and substantially reflected the 
changing nature of Cape society as it passed from an agrarian society dominated by 
the production and export of wool in the mid-nineteenth century (13) to one 
increasingly permeated by mining capital in the last decade or so of the century 
during the premiership of Cecil Rhodes. This transformation, however, has not 
received sufficient attention from liberal historians, and Phyllis Lewsen, especially, 
has interpreted the "conservative liberalism" of the Cape in terms essentially of the 
importation ELnd maintenance of the ideas of mid-Victorian liberalism. (14) 
This importation of ideas of liberalism, and their propagation by the 
churches, press and later universities, was an essential feature of liberalism in 
South Africa, but it is at the same time necessary to analyse both the meaning and 
flxction of such ideas in terms of the dominant class and ethnic relationships in the 
Cape society of the tirde. One of the features of the original Cape franchise of 1853, 
when Coloured men were included on the voters! roll on the basis of a g25 property 
qwification or a salary of £50, was that it occurred in the context of a transformed 
relationship between the colony and the British metropolis. The da,ys of mercantilism 
were over,and the introduction of Free Trade throw Robert Peel's %pealing of the 
Corn Laws in 1846 resulted in a changed attitude in Britain towards keeping the Cape 
as a specific economic asset. The removal of trading preferences meant a decline in 
* opposition to the idea of granting the Cape representative institutions (15), though 
the exact nature of these institutions remained to a considerable extent the product of 
the class relationships inside the Colony. 
To this extent, the creation of "liberal11 institutions in the Cape can be 
seen as occurring at a certain historical moment and their exact working resulted from 
what Stanley Trapido has seen as a "great tradition" at the colonial level, based on 
financial and commercial enterprises, the opposition to the government, the legal 
profession and the press, and a "small tradition" which operated at the local level 
and which incorporated the economic nexus between white merchants and traders and the 
Eastern Cape African peasantry. (16) By the 1840s, neither the missions nor the 
dominant commercial enterprises in the Colony s o m t  to expand territorially, and the 
1853 Constitution reflected a search for both political consolidation in the wake of a 
decline in direct imperial control and a growing appetite for speculative ventures. (17) 
What has been seen as the llheyda#l of the African peasantry thus followed, thorn by 
the 1870s additional pressures began to assert themselves to both renew territorial 
expansion in the Eastern Cape and check African farming at the expense of a growing 
class of white settlers. (18) The beginnings of Afrikaner nationalism iri the 1870s 
and the formation of the Afr-er Bond in 1880 ended a period when Cape politics had 
been free of par* political divisions, and the original fear of Robert Godlonton and 
the English-speaking settlers at the time of the 1853 Constitution that they would be 
overwhelmed by a coalition of Dutch and Coloured voters became transformed to a fear, 
by the 18808, that the Afxikaner Bond of l10n%e Jan" Hofmeyr would be excluded by a 
combination of Ehglish votes and those of the Coloureds and Eastern Cape peasantry. (19) 
By this time as well, a wider change was occurring in the nature of Victorian 
liberalism which marked a shift away from an ideology of laissez-faire individualism 
and social Darwinist ideology based on competition within a society between individuals 
to a more collectivist-orientated imperialism that emphasized competition between 
nations. (20) This collectivism ushered in a "search for orderv1 (21) and an increasing 
emphasis upon state regulation of the economic and political spheres. In Britain, the 
1867 Reform Act and the enfranchisement of the urban working class maxked a renewed 
upsurge in class-based political action which had been absent since the defeat of 
Chartism (22), and politics became increasingly defined both by the role of organized 
labour, marked by the founding of the TUC in 1872, and organized political parties 
through the founding of the modern Conservative Party in 1867 and the Liberal Party in 
1868. All these developments can be seen to have a ripple effect in the colonial 
environment of the Cape, and political life there in the last two decades of the 
nineteenth century marked a progressive shift away from the liberal ideas that had 
underpinned the original Constitution in 1853. 
Colonial societies, though, are much more insecure in the foundations of 
their structures than metropolitan ones, and changes that are frequently capable of 
being absorbed in mature iqdustrial societies such as Britain and America,thmugh 
"CO-option" and the institutionalization of formerly antagonistic classes, are much 
more difficult to control in the setting of peripheral capitalism. John Foster, in 
a recent study of Oldham, Northampton and South Shields, has concluded that much of 
this co-optation and "re-isolation of the working class vanguardw in Britain had 
occurred by the end of the second quarter of the nineteenth century and was further 
assisted by the development of the last phase of imperial expansion in the late 1870s 
and the 1880s. (23) A similar phenomenon can be seen to occur at the Cape, though 
* it was.struc3ured on racial lines and took place later on in the century, in the 
1880s and 1890s. At' the time of the 1853 Constitution such co-optation had not, for 
the most part, been necessary, owing to the absence of organized labour: in Cape 
Town, for instance, the first trade unions were formed only in 1881, with the 
foundation of the Typographical Society and a branch of the Wlish Amalgamated 
Society of Carpenters and Joiners. (24) Control was maintained on the most 
repressive terms, and. in 1856 the Cape parliament passed the Masters and Servants Act 
that applied to both ex-slaves and the African peasantry, as well as Coloured and 
African farm labourers; breaches of the Act resulted in one monthls imprisonment for 
a first offence and six weeks in solitary confinement on a spare diet forsubsequent 
offences. The Act's legacy, however, was to ensure the perpetuation of racial 
divisions within the working class in the exa of industrialization after the Kimberley 
diamond discoveries, a phenomenon ably assisted by the isolation of African workers 
on the De Beers Mine in compounds. Thus, when trade unionism did develop in diamond 
mining in the 1890s, it was confined to white workers, who formed the Kni@ts of 
Labour in 1891 Ehnd attacked both monopoly capital and "the insidious attack of cheap 
labour competition". (25) 
It was in response to this growth of trade unionism and the progressive 
decline of the liberal laissez-faire model that there developed an increasingly 
raciallJi exclusive ideology in the last decade of the nineteenth century in the Cape. 
As in Britain, liberkl ideology based on the unit of the individual no longer acted 
as an effective mechanism of social control in an econonly increasingly shaped by the 
assertion of collective class interests. Though the operation of Cape liberalism and 
the growth of mission education, especially in the Eastern Cape, had produced a class 
of African political leadership exemplified by such figures as John Tengo Jabavu, the 
editor of Imvo Zabantsundu in Ung Williams Town, and Walter Rubusana in East London, 
who had been prominent in the foundation of the South African Native Congress in 1887, 
such a petty bourgeois class was incapable of acting as a strong enough political 
intermediary to control the emerging African proletariat on the diamond mines. 
Restrictions of the franchise had been passed in 1887 and 1892 to ensure the exclusion 
of the "blanket kaffir" from the voting process; the 1892 legislation raised the 
landed property qualification from £25 to £75, eliminating a £25 wage qualification and 
adding a literacy test. Thus only the mission educated Africaas who owned larger 
plots in the Eastern Cape remained, hence decreasirq rather than increasing the 
African petty bourgeoisiefs political effectiveness. Much of this can be attributed 
to the growing political assertion of white settlers and organized white labour as 
well as the desire politically to neutralize non-kholwa African migrants on the mines. 
But this left the question of what alternative mechanisms of social control over 
the emerging African proletariat were available to the white polity in the Cape. The 
answer, in the form of the Glen Grey Act in 1894, partially indicated the nature of 
' the later strategy of segregation. 
The Glen G m  Act and the Develoment of Semmtion 
The development of territorial or "possessoryt~ segregation in South Africa 
has been closely identified by scholam with the system of colonial rule evolved by 
Theophilus Shepstone in Natal, based on institutionalized tribal strucms. (26) 
This identification between segregatfonist ideology and tribalism has led, more 
recently, to the suggestion by Shula Marks that, in comparison to Natal, in the Cape 
there wasttlittle material base for an ideology of segregationv,because the "forces 
of colonialismn were "far strongerIf and "the disintegration of precolonial structures 
more thorough-going", to sustain a segregationist system based on large tribal 
units. In comparison, Dr Marks suggests, on the basis of earlier work by Stanley 
Trapido, that the Cape developed an "assimilationist ideology" which "emerged out of 
the dominance of the mercantile class, interested in fostering a stable and 
prosperous African .peasantry: a peasantry which could only be prdduced by a partial 
restructuring of pre-colonial society, though the Mfecane and the flight into the 
Cape of the Mfengu and later the 1867 cattle-killing undoubtedly facilitated the 
process". (27) This view of Cape liberalism closely coincides with that of Phyllis 
Lewsen in its emphasis upon the mid-Victorian legacy of the 1853 Constitution and 
the incorporation of the African peasantry by the "great tradition" of Cape mercantile 
capital. However, it overlooks the changes in the Cape liberal ideology in the last 
decade or so of the nineteenth century, when the emergence of the ideology of 
assimilation of an educated African class of kholwa took place in response to the 
decline of the earlier ideology of incorporation of individuals as opposed to classes. 
This later ideology developed substantially out of the decline of mercantile capital's 
dominance in the Cape and the emergence of mining capital as a powerful political 
force with the premiership of Cecil Rhodes in 1890. 
IRhodesls premiership, in fact, b m w t  to a head a long debate in the Cape 
on the exact role chiefs and tribal institutions should plw in the political process. 
Some g6vernments had been considerably well disposed to the idea of extending the 
power of chiefly structures under British imperial hegemony on lines quite simila to 
Shepstone in Natal. In 1881, for example, the government of Gordon Sprigg had been 
replaced by Thomas Scanlen, who appointed General "Chinese" Gordon to look after 
native affairs. Gordonls "solution" was the granting of greater powers to African 
chiefs and the sweeping awq of "a great many of the present officials from the 
Tramkei" (28), and this he succeeded in doing with respect of Basutoland, which 
reverted to British control in 1884 and later became'a model for some of the 
segregationist ideas of the Commissioner for Native Affairs in the Transvaal under 
Milner, Sir Godfrey Lagden. (29) But he failed with respect to the Transkei, and a 
coalition of Upington, Hofmeyr and Sprigg defeated him in 1884 after he attempted a 
similar policy in Bechuanaland. (30) Scarden's policy, however, had been backed by 
many missions in the Cape, and his defeat came as a disappointment to James Stewart 
who concluded that "the prospecOs of the natives were never blacker than they are at 
present". (31) Given such pressures for racial separation, it is difficult to conclude, 
therefore, that;, even before the moves for racial exclusion in the 1890s, all the groups 
in the " m a t  tradition" in the Cape were necessarily in favour of assimilation. 
With respect to those areas in the Eastern Cape of Mfengu and Thembu 
settlement, it is certainly true that a growing process of political incorporation 
had taken place in the decades following the 1853 Constitution. In some respects, 
this process resembled patron-client relations that are characteristic of peasant 
politics (32), and the essential political figure at the local level, Fn the absence 
of tribal structures as a result of the Mfecane, was that of the headman. He it was 
who was responsible for land allocation throw the control of a small council, and 
the Cape administration increasingly focussed on the role of the headman while the 
powers of the chiefs declined. (33) However, at the same time there was a ma.rked 
increase by the latter years of the century in the political activities of the 
mission-educated kholwa, who tended to eclipse the influence of the headmen. In the 
case of elections, there was a growing dependence on a class of what Trapido has 
called t~semi-pmfessional politicians" and African election agents which broke 
through barriers of race, language and culture. (34) This phenomenon was escalated 
by the gmwth of pa.rty politics in the Cape and the alignment of factions behind 
different political parties: by 1904, for instance, the Tembu leading paper, m 
La Bantu, edited by Alan Soga, supported the Progmssive Par@ founded by Ceeil 
Rhodes, a l e  its rival, Imvo Zabantsundu of John Tengo Jabavu, supported the 
Bond. (35) 
It was this growth in the political influence of the kholwa and plmodernff 
African petty bourgeoisie that the Glen Grey Act sought to stem. In many cases, 
it was used to check the political and economic aspirations of the flmodern'l 
petty bourgeoisie who had been able to turn the location boards to 
their advantage. The Civil Commissioner in Glen Grey, for instance, strongly backed 
the appointment of headman Solomon Basmeni in Mkapusi Location, even though the 
location board were "working against himf1,on the grounds that his control needed to 
be restored: the board was reported as persuading local Africans not to attend 
meetings called by the headman, while anyone wishing to build a hut on the commonage - 
was charged 3% by the board "and no-one knows what happens to the moneyt1. (35) Much 
of this opposition, furthermore, was a result of the fact that Africans were not - 
consulted on appointments made in the location. . 
This struggle for control at a local level was further illustrated in the 
case of the Fingqutu Location in Lady fiere, where a number of "registered owners of 
allotments" drew up a petition at a public meeting in May 1904 with the assistance of 
the Queenstown labour agent, and later a leading figure in the Bantu Union, Meshach 
Pelem. The allotment holders' reliance on such a leading kholwa as Pelem illustrated 
the balance of political forces and the use being made by the administration to 
exclude certain land-holders from title rights. Of the forty who signed the petition, 
it was later claimed that nine were "dead", one had no allotment in his name, eight 
were "at workN, and one had been "gone a long time", which, if correct, left only 
twenty-one with any legitimate claims. (36) The claimants, however, clearly preferred 
to work directly via Pelem rather than the location headman, who was reported as 
having heard nothing about the claims. (37) The petitioners, in particular, sought 
their land claims by survey "with the exception of [acting headman] Mqikela and a few 
others who hold and cultivate several allotments which are in names of persons of 
doubtful existence and who if they do exist at. dl[sic] have their existence only in 
the imaginations of those who hold the allotments". Furthermore, Pelem claimed, 
since the return of the petition which was sent to 
Acting headman Mqikela he has been um~sually very 
busy holding meetings and misleading the people by 
telling them that if they have their building lots 
surveyed they would have no grazing rights in the 
commonage and the Government would at once take 
possession of it and let it to the farmers and the 
mtives would be required to graze their cattle 
within the limits of the lots surveyed as building 
sites for them and they would be further compelled 
by Government to push up strong substantial dwelling 
houses which they would not be able to pay for. (38) 
The case illustrated how the government's support for headmen thus worked 
against the further surveying of allotments under the Glen Grey Act while also 
contributing to the exclusion of land holders,who were forced (in the case of those 
reported "at work" and "gone a long time") into labour migrancy. Thus,tho@ the 
Glen Grey system was extended almost immediately after the passing of the Act from 
Glen Grey itself to the Transkeian districts of Butterworth, Idutywa, Nqawakwe and 
Tsomo in 1894, while Kentani came in voluntarily in 1899 /39), for the most part the 
administration acted with extreme caution in implementing the policy. Magistrates of 
other districts evinced concern as possible opposition to the spread of individual 
tenure, from the very headmen on whose support the system of colonial clientelege 
depended. In 1902, Kalanga was not considered a suitable district, owing 
to "some opposition on account of objections to the land tenure system" (40), while 
the Chief Magistrate of Tembuland, Transkei and Pondoland urged that "it would be 
unwise to force the provisions of the Glen Grey Act upon aqy of the districts under my 
care. To do so would be regarded by many as a grievance against the Government, but . . . 
there axe indications in some of the districts of a desire amongst the people to have 
the Proclamation applied, and I think it is far better to wait until it is asked for, 
then .it could be gmnted as a concession, than to force it upon them unwillingly" 
(emphasis added). (41) This policy of caution had the result of considerably delaying 
the creation of a class of free peasants under the Act, and, thou& some observers as 
late as the 1920s were optimistic as to the Act's gradually being extended (42), it 
became increasingly clear that only a small minority of peasants were going to be 
established under the Act. In 1922 a Location Surveys Commission indicated that 
settlement under the Act had not had the effect of establishing qthing like a 
secure peasantry,for 4077 of Glen Grey allohents had passed into hands different from 
their original holders (43), while by 1925 it emerged that only 7 of the 27 Transkeian 
districts had been surveyed, with a total of 50,000 land titles registered in Umtata 
at a cost to each holder of £4.5~. (44) 
On the other hand, the ideals implicit within the Glen Grey system left a 
lasting legacy on liberal thinking in South Africa in the twentieth century and formed 
a considerable basis fcrr an ostensibly liberal llaltexnative" to the ideology of 
territorial segregation. This was particularly noteworthy in the council system 
involved in Glen Grey. Under the Act, a system of district councils were established 
together with a Transkeian Territories General Council, covering the four 
original Glen Grey districts. This Council, or ~~1~ as it was more commonly 
called, was gradually extended beyond the initial quit rent areas of Glen Grey to 
incorporate seven Transkei districts by 1905, and in 1911 a separate council was 
established for Pondoland,called the Pondoland General Council. Eventually the two 
councils merged in 1931 to form the United Transkeian Territories General Counci1,and 
the model of a separate flconsultativett body incorporating both chiefs and headmen and 
the traditional elite, on the one hand, together with the tlmodernll petty bourgeoisie, 
on the other, was used to form the Natives Representative Council in 1936, when the 
Cape African voters were removed from the common roll. For m m y  liberals this council 
system represented a mechanism for "advanced" Africans to become involved in the 
political process as well as including "traditional" or "redft Africans under the 
control of chiefs. In 1908, for instance, a deputation sent by the Natal government, 
consisting of Frederick Bridgman, Martin L. Luthuli and P. J. Gumede, praised the 
Transkeian council system and noted its extension beyond the kholwa and educated class: 
In most of the Council districts, there is but a 
sprinkling of adult natives who may be classed as 
civilised. It was most difficult to realise that 
it was the raw Native who was supplying the bulk 
of the £50,000 with which the Council finances its 
operations, and that, therefore, it was the 1blanket 
kaffirt who holds the larger share in the proprietor 
ship of the 'Bhungat roads, wattle plantations, 
dipping tanks, agricultural institution, with its 
prise livestock etc. These considerations are .all the 
more surprising when we recall the fact that the 
Proclamation providing for the Council system is, as 
with the tenure, only permissive: and that the 
Council system, with its 10s rate, only becomes 
operative in a given district when the Natives of 
that district express a desire for the extension of 
the Proclamation to that area. (45) 
These conclusions were of considerable significance in Natal in the wake of 
the Bambata Rebellion and led one of the members of the 1907 Native Affairs Conmnission, 
the segregationist Maurice hrans, to take up the council idea as part of a native 
policy for a United South Africa in his book Black and White in South East Africa, 
which appeared in 1911. (46) This fascination with an ostensibly "voluntaryf1 
adherence by "raww Africans to the Council system when, as we have seen in the case 
of the Glen Grey land policy, it was by and large an extension of ties between the 
colonial administration and "traditional" elements of chiefs and headmen, leads in fact 
to the conclusion that the Cape "liberal tradition" of native policy contributed in no 
small measure to the evolution of policy after Union in a segregationist direction. 
This tradition acted in particular on the thinking behind the Native Affairs Act of 
1920 introduced by Smuts in the wake of a wave of strikes and urban unrest after the 
first world war. 
The Glen Grey land system, however, can also be seen, in its original 
formulation presented by Cecil Rhodes in 1894, to contribute to liberal thinking in 
the period after Union. For many analysts a d  critics, the idea of settling a 
freehold (or quit rent) African peasantry on the land as a block to continuing 
urbanization acted as a key means for preserving some liberal values in the face of a 
growing agitation for a colour bar in the urban areas from the white petty bourgeoisie 
and working class. Despite the fact that the provision in the original Glen Grey Act 
for a labour tax of 10s per annum was removed in 1905, the model of rural settlement 
implicit within the Act was represented as forming an effective mechanism of social 
control for the needs of mining capital. In 1913, for instance, in the aftermath of a 
"Black Peril" scare on the Rand, when the issue of liquor and assaults on white women 
reached new heights (47), the Act was defended as an effective means to control the 
spread of liquor among rural Africans. C. G. Bird, for instance, an official in the 
Native Affairs Department in the Cape, wrote that no new liquor licences could be 
granted without prior approval by the district council and that such councils 
represented an important means of control over migrants until "conditions on the mines 
receive closer supervisionw. (48) Similarly, Edg;ar Brookes, in his segregationist work 
published in 1924 with the blessing of Hertzog, The History of Native Policy in South 
Africa, argued for the extension of the Glen Grey system of individual tenure for 
'kdvanced communities of Natives in other Provincesn as part of a wider scheme to 
ensure the exclusion of Africans from permanent participation in the urban industrial 
economy. (49) : 
Industrialists? It is neither for their good nor 
ours that they should become industrialists 
permanently or on a large scale. They are far 
happier, far more moral and in a far more natural 
state on the land than in the big towns - that no 
one denies. (50) 
This idea led Brookes to encourage Hertzog to espouse a scheme of neutral 
areas on lines similar to the Glen Grey scheme in the Cape and the Native hnrchase 
areas in Rhodesia, as part of his ffsoLutionff in the 1926 Bills. Thou@ Brookes later 
moved a w  from these ideas in recognition of the growth of a permanent African urban 
working class, the idea survived even into the 1940s, with the proposals of. - - 
R. B. A. Hoernle, who began his teaching career in Cape Town in 1912. Hoernle, too, 
argued for the settling of a peasantry as a means of resisting total proletarianization 
and, to this extent, agreed with much of the trusteeship proposals of George Heaton 
Nicholls . (51) 
The Glen Grey Act, therefore, formed an important basis behind a paternalist 
liberalism in twentieth century South Africa that emerged out of the decline of the 
individually based liberalism of the Cape from the mid-Victorian era. Its emphasis 
on individual land tenure was, in a sense, a faint echo of this earlier liberalism in 
an era increasingly defined by collective racial identities. What, thou&, were the 
ideological assumptions behind this liberalism as the Cape moved into the era of union 
with the northern states? Most liberals in South Africa who traced their ideological 
roots back to the Cape specifically denied being overtly segregationist in the sense 
of supporting the destruction of the common Cape franchise, the rights of Africans to 
land-ownership in urban areas and the confining of African land-ownership to specific 
locations and reserves. This ~vpossessory~~ segregation, as opposed to total 
%esidentialrl segregation (52), most South African liberals by the early 1930s 
disclaimed. In fact, by the time of the 1932 report of the Native Economic Commission, 
the archetypal liberal position was represented by Blex Roberts, the former teacher 
from Lovedale, who specifically opposed the Commissionfs ideological stance of 
adaptation, based on a view close to the British colonial practice of indirect rule, 
that sought to "adapt" African "traditional" institutions to dominant "European" ones. 
Instead, Roberts championed the alternative ideology of assimilation which, by the 
early 1930s, had grown considerably in western liberal thought as a result of the work 
of the Chicago School of Sociology, founded by Robert Ezra Park in 1915. (53) This 
formulation of assimilation, however, can be seen as emerging out of a liberal 
response to the rise of segregation in both the American south and South Africa and 
rested on collectivist premises, in contrast to the essentially individualist and 
laissez-faire premises of nineteenth century liberalism which had been engrained in 
the classical "Cape liberal traditionrf. 
This paper has only partially developed arguments that I am seeking to 
develop in a much larger study of ideologies of social control during the period of 
South African industrialization. However, in summarizing the -&rust of this paper, 
- b e  basic points emerge: 
The Cape cannot be seen as standing outside the thrust towards segregation 
in the early years of the twentieth century. In fact, the Glen Grey Act and 
ideological debate in the Cape reflected a closer convergence with American 
segregationist practices than did the tribally-based model in Natal. 
Furthermore, the Shepstonian legacy from Natal formed only one possible model 
of segregation while the Cape verged more towards Southern practices of 
control based on a rural squatter-peasantry and an ideology of Tuskegee-type 
industrial training. 
2) Cape ffass@ilationism" was not a traditional featme of the "Cape liberal 
traditionf1 but rather emerged in response to the rise of segregationist 
ideology in the twentieth century. Assimilation thus formed a dominant 
ideological basis behind liberal thinking that sought a shift away from 
institutionalized racial and tribal controls engrained in segregation towards 
class ones, whilst at the same time, as in the thought of R. F. A. Hoernle, 
seeking to resist complete African proletarianization by rooting a section of 
the African peasantry on the land. (54) 
The development of assimilation refutes the view of an unbroken "Cape 
liberal tradition" espoused by liberal historiography that was destroyed by 
the political creation of Union in 1910. The development of assimilation 
before then reflected the growing racialization of thinking in the Cape, such 
that Union was at most a catalyst to an ongoing process that was already 
taking place. In addition, many Cape liberals played an important role in 
the formulation of native policy in the period after Union: F. S. Malan was 
Minister of Native Affairs, Edward Dower the Secretary of Native Affairs 
after Union, while magistrates such as W. C. Scully and J. E. Moffat shaped 
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